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MICROPROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY AND SINGLE
EVENT UPSET SUSCEPTIBILITY
L.D. Akers
University of Colorado
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Abstract

Single Event Upsets

Today's small satellites employ powerful
microcircuits to control virtually every aspect of the
spacecraft. While these small devices are very
capable, they are increasingly vulnerable to heavy ion
induced Single Event Upset (SEU). Current
technology is not very susceptible to SEUs. The
evolution of microdevices is toward lower power and
higher speed while spacecraft evolve toward smaller
and lighter structures. This combination, along with
the increased heavy ion particle fluence associated
with large solar flares, will cause tomorrow's
microdevices to experience SEU at rates approaching
100 upsets per device per day! To ensure mission
success, these small satellites must consider
implementing one or more SEU mitigation techniques.

In recent years, spacecraft have experienced "bit
flips" in memory and processing devices. These state
changes are most frequently attributed to the ionizing
radiation of a single energetic particle, thus the name
Single Event Upset. Galactic and solar cosmic rays
composed of nuclei from heavy ions, are most
frequently the cause of single event phenomena.
When an ionizing particle passes through the depletion
region of a semiconductor circuit, the particle deposits
charge along its path. The deposited charge is swept
up by the electric field in the depletion region and
results in a short current pulse in the circuit. If that
pulse is large enough and lasts long enough, the
feedback will cause a change in the final state of the
circuit. This is interpreted by the rest of the
electronics as a "bit-flip" because the memory location
now reads the opposite of what it did before the
particle transit.
Charge deposited in a semiconductor device
affects different technologies in different ways, but the
net result is an upset of the device causing
2
performance degradation • Flip-flop circuits change
logic states when an ionizing particle deposits
sufficient charge in the depletion region. For bipolar
transistors, ionizing radiation causes a conducting path
from the base to the emitter which directs base current
away from the main base current path, resulting in a
loss of gain of the transistor. Ionizing radiation affects
Junction Field Effect Transistors (JFETs) by increasing
the gate to channel leakage current and contributing to
noise currents.
SEUs in all types of microprocessor technologies
3
were first predicted in 1962 by Walmark and Marcus .
They examined the evolution of microcircuits and
predicted that smaller devices of the future would be
vulnerable to upset. Because the work was ahead of
its time, spacecraft designers ignored the prediction.
4
In 1975, Binder, Smith, and Holman published a
paper in which they identified upsets in flip-flop
circuits in space using a scanning electron microscope
to simulate the ionization caused by iron nuclei.
Again, designers ignored the research. Not until
upsets due to cosmic rays were seen on GPS spacecraft
in 1978 did designers take notes. Since that time,
SEUs have been observed on nearly all spacecraft.

Introduction
Cosmic radiation is composed of both galactic
cosmic rays and solar cosmic rays. Galactic cosmic
rays are high energy nuclei that propagate through
intergalactic space. These particles may originate
from stars both within and outside of the Milky Way
Galaxy. Solar cosmic rays are high energy particles
that originate from our own Sun. Galactic cosmic
radiation is most intense during solar minimum while
solar cosmic radiation is most intense at solar
maximum!. SEUs from galactic and solar cosmic
radiation can cause many undesirable effects,
including!: damage to data in memory, damage to
software, halting the Central Processing Unit (CPU),
writing over critical data tables, and unplanned events
including loss of mission.
Some effects of SEU s are easy to correct. Data
stored in memory can often be recreated via software
re-execution or reading from hardened memory.
Volatile software can be reloaded through ground
commands, but hard errors in a software storage
location may permanently COmIpt the software. A
halted CPU cycle causes lost operation time, which
can have detrimental effects on attitude control or
mission data gathering. Some corrupted critical data
tables can be recreated, but others may be permanently
damaged and can cause serious operational impacts.
Anomalies resulting from SEU s can cause flight
software to be executed at the wrong time, components
to be commanded on or off, or the mission to be
unexpectedly tenninated.
1

Technology Development

particle energy threshold for SEU effects. A similar
diagram was used by the Galileo proj ect engineers to
show NASA why single event upsets were a design
consideration for Galileo and not for Voyager. The
Galileo program wanted to estimate, based on previous
component performance, where technology was
leading with respect to SEU hardness.
Early Complementary Metal Oxide
Semiconductor (CMOS) technology was not
susceptible to SEU because the devices were large and
had high critical charges. As the P-channel Metal
Oxide Semiconductor (PMOS), Large Scale
Integration (LSI), and Integrated Injection Logic (Ill.,)
technologies were developed, SEU susceptibility
increased. The lower critical charges of these devices
left them vulnerable to the more prevalent lower
energy cosmic rays.
One of the most important factors in determining
the SEU rate is the feature size. The smaller the
processor size, the faster the processing speed, and the
lower power required to maintain or change data in the
memory. Processor size can be related to the critical
charge, Qc, by:
Qc =0.023 *L2
(1)
where L is the longest pathlength through the

The commercialization of space has led spacecraft
manufacturers to faster, smaller, cheaper, and more
capable spacecraft. Today's spacecraft employ less
shielding and faster, smaller microprocessors. While
this trend provides more powerful, less expensive
spacecraft, it leaves them more susceptible to SEU.
Spacecraft microprocessors and memory devices of the
early 1970's were large, power consuming devices
with limited computing power. With critical charges
(minimum charge required to change logic states) as
high as fifty to one hundred picocoulombs, these
processors had performance drawbacks, but they were
well suited for survival in the space environment. As
processors evolve toward lower power and faster
speed, they allow spacecraft to execute more
sophisticated and powerful software with minimal
power requirements. This increased performance is
possible only through reducing the size of the chip and
the amount of charge required to store information.
Today's typical processors have a critical charge
6
between three and ten picocoulombs. Figure 1
illustrates this evolution in memory and
microprocessors. The y axis represents the energy
required to operate the device, and the x axis is the
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increasing SEU vulnerability of smaller cross section
devices.
As a device's critical charge decreases, the circuit
can be upset by the more prevalent lower energy
cosmic rays which can have energies ranging from
nearly 0 to over 20 GeV. The combination of the
lower critical charge and the higher particle flux (as
energy decreases) makes the smaller processors more
susceptible to SEU .
When a cosmic ray particle travels through a
device, it loses energy through ionization. Linear
Energy Transfer (LET) is the tenn used to describe the
energy depositing capability of the incident particle. It
is a convenient metric for calculation because it allows
the use of one number to characterize the energies of
all ion species. LET is expressed in terms of the
energy lost (dE) by the particle in traveling a distance
(dx). Typically, LET is divided by the density of the
target material, so that it becomes
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vulnerable cross section. Although actual critical
charge and device size must be detemrined
experimentally, this approximation is sufficient for
most SEU calculation applications. The critical
charge for various depletion depths is plotted in Figure
26. As the device depth decreases, the critical charge
also decreases. The equation for Qc holds true for
many types of devices, including CMOS, N channel
Metal Oxide Semiconductor (NMOS), and IIL. This
analysis uses this relationship to demonstrate the

LET =2. dE .

(2)

pdx
Units are MeV cm2/mg. LET can be related to the
charge deposited by the relationship:
(3)

LET =

Dp
The particle's pathlength, D, in the target material is
measured in centimeters. The charge, Q, (in
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Figure 4: Solar Flare Environment LET Spectrum
where Qc is the circuit's critical charge and D is the
longest pathlength through the device. As the particle
energy increases, the particle becomes more likely to
cause a more severe SEE, possibly resulting in a
circuit failure. Table 17 shows the five types of SEE, in
order of increasing severity.
Table 1: Single Event Effects

picocoulombs) is deposited by the particle as it moves
through the device. The constant 22.5 is required in
the conversion from picocoulombs to electron volts.
To show the particle fluence for a given orbit
under a specified solar condition, researchers
commonly use the integral LET spectrum plot. Figure
3 shows the LET spectrum for various orbits during
solar minimum. The high altitude and/or high
inclination orbits are exposed to the greatest cosmic
ray fluence because of decreased geomagnetic
shielding effects. During periods of intense solar
activity, the cosmic ray fluence can be much greater.
The particle conditions after the March 1991 X9 level
solar flare were enhanced by as much as 106 times.
This particle fluence (a worst case scenario) is shown
in Figure 4. This analysis focuses on the
geosynchronous orbit because it presents the overall
greatest risk to spacecraft microelectronics.
Single event upsets are not limited to "bit flips."
Five levels of single event effects (SEE) can impair
circuit perfonnance. An SEU is the most benign of the
SEEs. It is caused by a particle capable of depositing
charge equal to or greater than the device's critical
charge. The LET of these particles is called the
threshold LET, and is defined as:
(4)
LET = 225Qc
Dp

Single Event
Effect Type
Single Event
Upset
Single Hard
Error
Single Event
Latchup

Single Event
Burnout
Single Event
Gate Rupture

4

Circuit Response
A change of state or transient induced by
an energetic particle such as a cosmic ray
An SEU that causes a pennanent change
to the operation of a device (a stuck
memory bit)
A condition that causes the loss of device
functionality due to a single event
induced high current state. Mayor may
not cause permanent failure, but requires
power strobing to return to normal
operations
A condition which can cause device
destruction due to a high current state in a
power transistor
A single ion induced condition in power
MOSFETs that may result in the
fonnation of a conducting path in the gate
oxide.
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A decrease in threshold LET increases the device
susceptibility to all types of SEE. Because the particle
flux decreases with increasing energy, the probability
of more severe SEEs is lower than that of SEUs. Only
the susceptibility of SEU is addressed in this study,
since an increased SEU rate implies an increased rate
of other single event effects.

The term D(d(L» represents the pathlength
distribution probability function, flux(let>L o) is the
particle flux, Qcrit is the circuit's critical charge. The
constant is the same as in equation 3. This equation is
integrated over the portion of the LET spectrum able
to cause upset in the device.
The rate equation yields results of upsets per bit
per second. Each bit must be analyzed separately, as
different storage areas in the same microprocessor may
have different vulnerable cross sections, and the total
device upset rate may not be as simple as the upset
rate per bit per day times the number of bits. A
weighting factor may be required to compensate for
the different upset rates across the microprocessor.
6
For example, the Texas Instruments SBP9989
processor has two different vulnerable cross sections.
The ftrst section, which contains 70% of the bits is
sized at IOxlOx1.8 microns per bit. The remaining
30% of the vulnerable cross section is composed of
15% each 100xlOx1.8 and lxlx1.8 microns per bit.

Upset Rate Calculation
The algorithm used in this analysis is based on Dr.
James Adams' Cosmic Ray Effects on
Microelectronics (CRE1v1E)8 model and the
CRRES/SPACERAD Heavy Ion Model of the
Environment (CHTh1E)9 model developed jointly by
Lockheed Palo Alto, Louisiana State University, and
the University of Chicago. The CRE1v1E model was
developed in 1986 and fonns the basis of the upset rate
calculation. The CHTh1E model provides updated
LET spectra information based on new measurements
of the cosmic ray environment. Recent advances in
the knowledge of the space radiation environment
showed the CRE1v1E model to overestimate the particle
fluence in many environments. This contributed to a
corresponding overestimation of upset rates.
The upset rate for a microprocessor may be
calculated by evaluating an integral containing the
target size (cross section), the pathlength distribution
through the sensitive region, the ion distribution as a
function of LET and spatial parameters, and the
device's critical charge. The function is:
92 211
11
E2
(5)
rate =
d~ ~ dEfz (E,8,~)0- (E,8,~)·

Model Results
The five microprocessors used in this analysis
represent technologies currently on orbit and future
developments. Current technology has depletion
depths of 2 microns and below. Designers estimate
that future technology could have depletion region
12
depths of 0.1 to 0.2 microns . The processor
dimensions are for each bit, not the entire device. The
five devices are summarized in Table 2. Figure 5
shows the increase in upset rate as device size
decreases.

l: f f f
z=1 0

0

El

The summation is over all ion species and the
integration is over all angles and energies. The flux,
fz(E,e,q,), is the number of particles of energy E,
atomic number z, and moving in the direction
indicated by the angles q, and e. The cross section is
defined by cr(E,e,q,), and represents the probability that
a particle in the given direction with energy, E, will
cause an upset. This function can be greatly simplified
6
by the following assumptions : (l) the vulnerable cross
section is defined as a function of LET rather that
energy and (2) the sensitive region is modeled as a
rectangular parallelepiped. The first assumption
- eliminates the need to sum over ion species and
integrate over all energies. The second assumption
0
allows the use of Bradford' S1 pathlength distribution
and eliminates the need to integrate over all angles.
The resulting equation is:
L,....,.
dL (6)
D(d(L»flux(let > Lo)
rate = 22.5rtcrQCrit

Table 2: Device Summary
Dimensions Cross
(microns)
Section
2
(micron )
960.00
20x20x2
880.00
20x20xl
15x15xO.5 480.00
10xl0xO.2 208.00
52.00
5x5xO.l

Critical Charge LETth
(Pico coulomb s (MeV
2
cm /mg)
6.300
18.492
6.289
18.423
4.715
10.356
3.142
4.061
1.571
1.150

The rates shown in Figure 5 are small; the highest rate
11
converts to more than 3.5xl0 years between upsets.
Although the galactic cosmic ray environment is more
dangerous during solar minimum, the upset danger is
not as significant as during solar maximum.
With solar minimum expected in 1997, and solar
maximum ramping up quickly in the following five
years, spacecraft launched today will be subj ected to
the much more violent particle environment associated
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The high upset rate frequency can have a crippling
effect on satellite operations.
The March '91 flare represents a severe
enhancement of heavy ion fluences. Flares of this
4
3
magnitude are not common, but large (10 .. 10 times
enhancement) can occur on an average of once a
month. These flares can enhance the near earth
particle environment for a period lasting from several
hours to several days. Figure 6 shows the upset rates
for the five processors in the Mar '91 flare
environment. These rates follow the same trend as for
a solar minimum environment, but the upset rates are
12
approximately 10 times higher.
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Small satellite programs frequently use the Intel
80x86 family and the R3000 processors. These
processors are vulnerable to the cosmic ray
environment in varying degrees. Table 3 shows the
device parameters such as cross section and critical
charge. Figure 7 shows a plot of the upset rates for six
typical orbits under both solar minimum and solar
flare conditions. Although the readily available
technology has not reached the depletion depths and
critical charge levels of the representative devices in
this study, they are still very susceptible to upset from
cosmic rays.
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Table 3: Actual Device Parameters

+--------....

Devicel
Manufacturer

-1.00E-01 +------+----~
1000
500
o

Cross Section (mic"2)

80861 Intel
80C86 I Intel
80C186 I Harris
80C286 I Harris
80386DX I Intel
80486DX2 I Intel
R3000/LSI
R3000A/LSI

Figure 6: Upset Rate for Flare Environment
(GEO)
with solar flares. A single solar flare can increase the
near earth particle fluence by as much as 100,000
times (Mar '91 Flare). The increased particle flux can
have a dramatic impact on SEU rates. In a solar flare
environment of this magnitude, a microprocessor can
experience as many as 0.7 upsets per bit per day. With
typical devices having between 100 and 500 sensitive
bits, these devices can see 70 to 350 upsets per day.
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Cross Section Critical
Charge
(J.l?) per bit
(PC)
7.186
600
49.630
10000
11.959
200
13.613
150
5.430
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7.604
100
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4.967
100
7.624
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Figure 7: Actual Device Upset Rates
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of another model for accurate results. The Chenette
upset rate model includes a user input option for
semiconductor material density.
A third limitation deals with the modeling of the
LET spectrum. This analysis models the LET spectra
as a step rather than continuous function. The LET
spectrum in this analysis used 50 steps between 0.03
2
and 100 MeV cm /mg, while the CREME model uses
1000. The increase in LET model accuracy improves
the model's prediction capability, but makes the
calculation more complex and time consuming. For
the most sensitive processor in the study (0.1 micron
depth), the upset rate calculated with 100 steps was
identical to the 50 step value to three significant digits.
A further limitation of the model is a function of the
LET spectrum. According to Adams, the SEU rate
calculation tends to be less accurate right below a
ledge in the LET spectrums. The rates calculated from
these spectra will tend to be more conservative
(higher) than actual data. Using multiple prediction
methods to calculate SEU rates will help alleviate this
inaccuracy.

Model Limitations
An important limitation of this model is the
requirement to input the dimensions of the vulnerable
cross section. In many cases, the cross section can be
comp~ted through testing, but the length, width, and
depth of the region often cannot be accurately
measured. By estimating these values, the probability
distribution of chord lengths through the sensitive
region can be miscalculated, resulting in false answers.
An underestimated depletion depth will result in a
higher estimate of the upset rate, while an
overestimated depth yields a lower than actual upset
rate. The rate calculation is not as sensitive to the
length/width ratio, but the sensitivity of the device
12
depends heavily on the thiclmess •
Another limitation is in the rate calculation itself.
Adams' CREME model calculates the upset rates for
silicon devices only. Semiconductor teclmology is
beginning to use other materials such as GaAs. The
material density is an important input to the upset rate
model, and calculations for these devices require use

7

Mitigation Techniques and Applications

using a technique known as "lockstepping." Two
processors operate simultaneously, executing identical
code, and the software compares the outputs. If there
is a discrepancy, the cycle is halted and the software
re-executed. The two processors must execute at
exactly the same clock speed. This requires a
phasing/synchronizing system either on the chip or in
external circuitry. To avoid the costly synchronization
problems, some designers are implementing redundant
CPUs with a voting logic design. In this technique,
the outputs of multiple CPUs are compared and the
output receiving the majority vote is implemented.
This technique usually employs three CPUs.
As technology improves, radiation hardening
becomes a more viable option. Hardening
significantly increases the cost of the chip, but has a
high probability of mitigating and eliminating SEU
effects. The most common technique for radiation
hardening is to modify the chip's construction by
adding layers of radiation hardened materials. This
technology is still in development and not yet widely
available. As processors decrease in size, critical
charge, and upset threshold, radiation hardening may
become the only reasonable solution to the SEU
problem. Table 4 compares various SEU detection
and correction techniques based on cost, impact, and
protection13.
Many commercial and research proj ects are
moving toward smallsat technologies. NASA's
smallsat initiatives have recognized the need for high
capacity, low power, low cost, radiation hardened
14
memories and processors • As designers select fast
processors with minimal shielding, operators will see
an increase in the number of single event effects. An
accurate SEU rate prediction program allows the
designers to include mitigation techniques in the
design before the operators become overwhelmed with
SEE recovery.
SEU predictiom can help optimize spacecraft

With upset rates as high as 350 per day, designers
require a method to mitigate the potentially crippling
effects of SEU s. The simplest method is through mass
shielding. Increasing the shield thickness around a
microprocessor decreases the number of cosmic ray
particles that can reach the chip. Only the most
energetic particles can actually penetrate the shielding
and cause upset. While this method is simple, the
additional shielding greatly increases the weight of the
spacecraft and can actually increase the rate at which
the penetrating high energy particles upset the circuit.
Since high energy particles move through
interplanetary space at near relativistic speeds, they
may not possess sufficient LET to upset a circuit. If
these particles are slowed down by a shield, they can
deposit more charge per unit time in the depletion
region, thus increasing the upset rate.
To protect against SEU effects without shielding,
many designers are including software to detect and
correct SEU caused errors. A common form for Error
Detecting and Correcting (EDAC) code uses a parity
checking and memory scrubbing routine to determine
if errors occurred, and reads recovery information
from a radiation hardened memory location. EDAC
code uses parity checks to detect memory errors. If
the memory cache is conupted, the information is reread from another source, or the CPU is halted and
restarted from scratch. Memory scrubbing is a process
where all memory locations are accessed and any
single bit errors corrected. An SEU rate of one upset
8
every 10 seconds (3.17 years) requires a memory
13
scrub every 0.1 seconds • This scrubbing frequency
can have a significant impact on flight software
execution because it detracts from the processing time
for flight software.
Hardwaremoilificatiomeliminatemanyofthe
problems associated with software error detection and
correction. High fault protection can be obtained

Table 4: SEU Mitigation Techniques
Physical Modification/Cost

Fault
Coverage

None

Perfonnanc
e
Degradation
None

Weight increased, launch costs

Software Checking

Extreme, bug prone

Moderate

Lockstep CPU s
Redundant CPU s

Checkpointingrequired
Voting and control
handling
Possibly none

None
None

None. Long software
development
Two CPU s. Moderate Cost
More hardware

Fair to
poor
Poor

Small

Extreme costs. Custom design

Technique

Software Impact

Shielding

Radiation
Hardening

8

Very high
Very high
High
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design in several areas. Some of the areas to consider
include15 :
• Design requirements/specification
• Selection of orbit parameters
• Design concept trade offs
• Semiconductor parts selection
• Evaluation of shielding protection
• Prediction of upset rates
• Selection of upset recovery techniques
• Calculation of system performance
• Qualification and acceptance tests
• Anomaly resolution and investigation
Based on this list, SEU prediction techniques have
applicability in all aspects of mission design--from
early concepts through mission operations to end of
life. Many of the design areas can have a significant
impact on the overall design. Orbit selection can drive
sensor choices; shielding levels may impact launch
vehicle selection, propulsion subsystem design, and
attitude control subsystem design. Mission operations
design must consider the effectiveness of mitigation
techniques and the difficulty of recovery techniques
when determining command and control system and
staff requirements. SEU rate prediction can help
designers best select components and optimize
spacecraft performance. Anomalies can often be
resolved faster if the operators know and understand
the spacecraft's vulnerability to space environmental
effects.

The calculations for SEU rates are complex and
component parameters are frequently unavailable. In
most cases, the size of the vulnerable cross section and
the critical charge must be determined experimentally.
Ground based cyclotron testing is expensive and the
waiting lists are often lengthy. Methods used to
calculate the upset rate vary widely and each produces
slightly different results. The best way to get accurate
SEU rate data is to use historical flight data or ground
test data. Many devices are catalogued by NASA's Jet
Propulsion Lab and can be found on the World Wide
Web at URL http://radnet.jpl.nasa.gov/.
Although this research identified electronic
component vulnerabilities to heavy ion induced SEU,
a host of other space environmental effects may cause
small devices to upset. High energy protons emitted
during solar flares or coronal mass ejections can cause
similar types of upsets. Spacecraft charging can result
in discharges through electronic circuits. The Van
Allen radiation belts are home to high energy
electrons, protons, and ions. The NASAlSMviPEX
program recently discovered a third radiation belt
within the inner Van Allen belt containing oxygen,
nitrogen, and neon ions (anomalous cosmic rays).
These effects cannot be ignored in spacecraft design,
but many can be reduced through effective mitigation
techniques.
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